Is it wrong to say Heidegger developed a metaphysics of technology? It doesn't seem to be so. The distinction he makes between technology and the essence of technology, a distinction that proves to be the core of his philosophy of technology, is clearly a metaphysical one: what appears is rooted in something else that does not appear . This is peculiar, for Heidegger is commonly known of course as a thinker who tenaciously tried to overcome metaphysics. In this paper, I (...) wish to examine to what extent Heidegger's philosophy of technology is metaphysical, and to what extent it isn't. In doing so, I want to make clear how Heidegger could arrive at the statement that the essence of technology jeopardizes the essence of man, and why according to him insight can bring salvation here. (shrink)

Only one year after the global wave of protest movements and revolts—starting with the ‘Arab Spring’, then, subsequently, the Indignados movement and Occupy- our appreciation of such movements turned sour. The aim of this contribution is to question the predominantly sceptical and defeatist discourse on these movements. One element central to many defeatist discourses on the 2011 movements, is the way in which a lack of demonstrable ‘outcomes’ or ‘successes’ is retrospectively ascribed to them. Therefore, an alternative approach should be (...) formulated, which would allow us to recognise the significant or valuable aspects of these movements and their practices, without downplaying them as ‘unsuccessful’ or ‘failures’ altogether. Pierre Rosanvallon’s concept of ‘counter-democracy’ and Hardt and Negri’s perspective of a ‘Multitude’ will be evaluated as alternative approaches to current political movements. Although they are meritorious, both perspectives do not go far enough and need further articulation. The notion of ‘prefiguration’, originally derived from contemporary anarchist discourse, could be beneficial to this endeavour. After defining and deepening this concept from an anarchist perspective, it will be applied to one particular context: the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo, during the 2011 revolution in Egypt. As will be concluded, in its application this concept of ‘prefiguration’ could teach us more about the recent wave of protest movements in general, and could help us to formulate a different approach to such movements. (shrink)

This article paradoxically tries to come closer to an idea of justice with the help of the destructive — anything but nihilistic — criticism thereof by Hans Kelsen. It argues that his relativistic approach, in which this idea undergoes a metamorphosis to become a realisable value of a social order, brings us closer to an obvious and objective form of justice that is almost taken for granted. Just in our liberal and plural democracy this approach might prove to be of (...) more value than a transcendental theory that passes speculative judgements on the essence of absolute justice, about which we are unable to come to an agreement. (shrink)

Research into Kelsen’s conception of judicial justice seems at first sight contradictory to his own Pure Theory of Law. Upon closer consideration this prima facie contradiction turns out to be only an appearance due to the paradoxical effect that is produced by Kelsen’s pure theory of law itself. By revealing three paradoxical effects of Kelsen’s work in this article, I try to show that research into a Kelsenian representation of judicial justice is not only possible but also meaningful. The first (...) paradox originates from Kelsen’s formalised and value-free concept of law, which unexpectedly confronts the judge with his moral responsibility for the material valuation of the law. Secondly, a paradox arises from Kelsen’s rationalised notion of relative justice, which in fact forces the judge to be absolutely convinced of the moral rightness of his judgement. The third paradox is a result of Kelsen’s idea of objectivised ‘social peace’, by which the judge just realises the subjective and irrational demands of justice. From my analysis of these three seeming contradictions in Kelsen’s pure theory of law emerges an apparent Kelsenian representation of judicial justice. Starting from his pure theory of law it should be possible to conceive of a ‘pure’ form of administration of law, which would stipulate social peace as a condition for the ‘purity’ of a judicial judgement. I even imagine that Kelsen considered peace as a conditio tacita for the validity of the whole legal order, just as he regarded the basic norm as conditio per quam and effectivity as conditio sine qua non for the validity of the legal order. In any case, according to Kelsen’s conception of judicial justice, social peace proves to be the implicit or tacit condition for a ‘pure’ judgement. With that this ‘pacifying jurisprudence’ can be understood as a surprising paragon of a ‘pure’ administration of justice, on the understanding that peace is not a sufficient but an obvious condition for a just administration of law. That this should also apply mutatis mutandis for Kelsen’s concept of the legal order as a whole will be made subject of further research. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen is renowned in the world of legal philosophy as one of the most important legal scholars of the 20th century and his most important work which brought him this renown, Pure Theory of Law, is therefore ‘world famous’. However, he is less well known as a legal pacifist and his main writings on law and peace, such as Peace through Law, are very rarely studied and almost never considered in relation to his Pure Theory of Law. Even the (...) more recent studies of Kelsen’s theory of democracy, which increased familiarity with Kelsen as an advocate of democracy and actually looked at his political work in the light of the Pure Theory of Law, contain almost no systematic or critical consideration of the value of peace, although both Kelsen’s legal theory and his theory of democracy at least give cause for this. Whereas other studies have already made the connection between the concepts of law and democracy in Kelsen’s work, this thesis concentrates on the concepts – also closely connected in his work – of law and peace. With this new approach this thesis hopes to contribute to a re-evaluation of Kelsen’s positivist legal philosophy by showing that the undervalued yet essential aspect of his legal pacifism can be understood as the tacit, ethical meaning of the Pure Theory of Law. (shrink)

Schopenhauer and Adorno on Bodily Suffering explores how the works of both philosophers revolve around an entwinement of pessimism and optimism, which links statements regarding the wrongness of the world to analyses of the human capability to experience compassion with bodily suffering and to the redeeming qualities of the arts.

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case study (...) illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985. (shrink)

It is possible to write a Kelsenian ‘Legal-Philosophical Tractate’ – based on Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law – after the example of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The following main and sub-propositions analogous to the main and sub-propositions of the Tractatus are a proof thereof and give an initial impetus to it: “May others come and do it better”. Unlike Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that ends with the famous proposition 7 that one should be silent about what cannot be spoken, a Kelsenian Tractate would (...) not end with an analogous main proposition, but with two sub-propositions that show the (relative) value of both ‘the speaking’ and ‘the silence’ of positive law. (shrink)

My article investigates the paradoxical dualism in Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, in which exists on the one hand a strict distinction and on the other hand a necessary relation between Is and Ought. I shall further try to answer the question whether Kelsen’s pure theory tacitly assumes in the conditions for validity of the positive legal order a basic value and underlying condition, namely, that of ‘social peace’. In order to answer that question, I will first sketch why Kelsen (...) actually differentiates Is and Ought and conceives of a relation between both categories. Then I will examine if and in what way the conditio tacita of social peace is implied in the conditions for legal validity. The concluding section will suggest what this implication possibly means for the valuation of the Pure Theory of Law and of its normative concept of the positive legal order. (shrink)

Religious and secular convictions have powerful effects, but their fundaments are often surprisingly fragile. Because of the conspicuous role that nationalisms, populisms, and fundamentalisms have in our globalizing world it is essential not to take their strength for granted, but to acknowledge that conviction and doubt are part of the same dynamic. The chapters in this volume demonstrate that doubt and hesitation are daily concerns even among the Maoist movement in India, right-wing populists in Europe and newly pious Somali Muslims (...) in London. In fact, new converts are often such stringent believers precisely because they need to dispel their own lingering doubts, while revolutionary movements survive only through the denial of ambiguity. By studying everyday doubt this volume unravels the mechanisms by which convictions gain and lose their force, and analyzes the dynamics that propel loosely held ideas into committed action. Whereas a focus on overcoming doubt highlights the exclusionary effects of committed action, attention to the breakdown of belief serves to better understand the cycles of hope, conviction, and disillusion that bespeak the human condition. This is the central theme in several chapters looking at ideological break-down. The collapse of communism, for instance, produced an epistemological crisis in which all knowledge became unstable, prompting gold-miners in Mongolia to go as far as to doubt the cosmos. The post-ideological environment of Western democracies also produces anxieties, as the break-down of the bonds of trust between governments and citizens results in feelings of betrayal. Questions of truth and action are always related: if nothing is worth fighting for then apathy and hopelessness may become symptomatic. By paying attention to the mechanisms and dynamics by which specific ideas gain and lose their credibility this volume sheds important new light on the role of ideas in social and political action. (shrink)

Adorno's moral philosophy is famously problematic. One of the main reasons for this is that it revolves around the moral addendum: a physical impulse of solidarity with suffering beings that, he argues, cannot and should not be rationalized. I show that, since this moral addendum remains vague and since Adorno's radical negativity forces him to dismiss as uncritical all other approaches to morality, he deliberately places his thought in danger of relapsing into irrationality. Most commentators therefore disagree about the manner (...) in which Adorno's references to the moral addendum can be translated into a moral theory. In this paper, I bring in some often overlooked material to form a more complete overview of the issues at hand and to adjudicate this contested area. I do this by briefly discussing Schopenhauer's moral observations on Mitleid and by focusing on Adorno's references to animal cruelty and corporeality. Although this interpretation stays close to Adorno's observations on the moral addendum, it forces us to accept that his moral philosophy is rather weak. I conclude, however, that this weakness reflects a disturbing aspect of reality and in that sense has critical value. (shrink)

Blackshaw and Hendricks have recently developed and defended the impairment argument against abortion, arguing that the immorality of giving a child fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) provides us with reason to believe that abortion is immoral. In this paper, we forward two criticisms of the impairment argument. First, we highlight that, as it currently stands, the argument is very weak and accomplishes very little. Second, we argue that Blackshaw and Hendricks are fundamentally mistaken about what makes giving a child FAS immoral. (...) Once we acknowledge this, it is clear that our intuitions about giving a child FAS provide no support for the supposed immorality of abortion. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work is used to evaluate the quality of work. Typical cases of meaningless work that have been used to clarify this concept are assembly line work, and work involving other types of mindless tasks, but also David Graeber's ‘bullshit jobs’. I argue that there are at least two fundamental reasons to care about meaningful work: reasons from the wellbeing of the worker and reasons pertaining to meaningfulness of the worker's life. I first argue that a concept (...) of meaningful work needs to reflect these two values, but that these two values may come apart. Because of this, accounts that provide a single answer to the question to what extent a particular work context is meaningful work for a particular worker are unable to reflect these two values. I then survey three promising accounts of meaningful work: perfectionism, which captures the self-interested aspect of meaningful work well but fails to capture the meaningfulness aspect appropriately; consequentialism, which captures the meaningfulness aspect well but fails to capture the self-interested aspect; and Wolf's Fitting Fulfilment View of meaningful projects, which can be read as addressing both concerns but leads to implausible judgments about meaningful work. I then argue that we should conceive of the concerns that fall under the notion of meaningful work as two separate concepts and values. The best work incorporates both these dimensions but falling short on either dimension is problematic for different reasons. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work is used to evaluate the quality of work. Typical cases of meaningless work that have been used to clarify this concept are assembly line work, and work involving other types of mindless tasks, but also David Graeber's ‘bullshit jobs’. I argue that there are at least two fundamental reasons to care about meaningful work: reasons from the wellbeing of the worker and reasons pertaining to meaningfulness of the worker's life. I first argue that a concept (...) of meaningful work needs to reflect these two values, but that these two values may come apart. Because of this, accounts that provide a single answer to the question to what extent a particular work context is meaningful work for a particular worker are unable to reflect these two values. I then survey three promising accounts of meaningful work: perfectionism, which captures the self-interested aspect of meaningful work well but fails to capture the meaningfulness aspect appropriately; consequentialism, which captures the meaningfulness aspect well but fails to capture the self-interested aspect; and Wolf's Fitting Fulfilment View of meaningful projects, which can be read as addressing both concerns but leads to implausible judgments about meaningful work. I then argue that we should conceive of the concerns that fall under the notion of meaningful work as two separate concepts and values. The best work incorporates both these dimensions but falling short on either dimension is problematic for different reasons. (shrink)

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas . van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and secondly in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

This paper offers a two dimensional variation of Standard Deontic Logic SDL, which we call 2SDL. Using 2SDL we can show that we can overcome many of the difficulties that SDL has in representing linguistic sets of Contrary-to-Duties (known as paradoxes) including the Chisholm, Ross, Good Samaritan and Forrester paradoxes. We note that many dimensional logics have been around since 1947, and so 2SDL could have been presented already in the 1970s. Better late than never! As a detailed case study (...) illustrating the power of 2SDL, we examine the system DL of Deontic Logic of Andrew Jones and Ingmar Pörn offered in 1985 to solve the Chisholm paradox of Contrary to Duties. The critical examination is done using logics and methods available in 1985 and solutions are proposed using what was available in 1985. (shrink)

This essay argues that there are theoretical benefits to keeping distinct—more pervasively than the literature has done so far—the psychological states of imagining that p versus believing that in-the-story p, when it comes to cognition of fiction and other forms of narrative. Positing both in the minds of a story’s audience helps explain the full range of reactions characteristic of story consumption. This distinction also has interesting conceptual and explanatory dimensions that haven’t been carefully observed, and the two mental state (...) types make distinct contributions to generating emotional responses to stories. Finally, the differences between the mental states illuminate how a given story can be both shared with others and at the same time experienced as personal. (shrink)

Regenerative Medicine promises to develop treatments to regrow healthy tissues and cure the physical body. One of the emerging developments within this field is regenerative implants, such as jawbone or heart valve implants, that can be broken down by the body and are gradually replaced with living tissue. Yet challenges for embodiment are to be expected, given that the implants are designed to integrate deeply into the tissue of the living body, so that implant and body become one. In this (...) paper, we explore how regenerative implants may affect the embodied experience of implant recipients. To this end, we take a phenomenological approach. First, we explore what insights the existing phenomenological and empirical literature on embodiment offers regarding the experience of illness and of living with regular (non-regenerative) implants and organ transplants. Second, we apply these insights to better understand how future implant recipients might experience living with regenerative implants. Third, we conclude that concepts and considerations from the existing phenomenological literature do not sufficiently address what it might be like to live with an implantable technology that, over time, becomes one with the living body. We argue that the interwovenness and intimate relationship of people living with regenerative implants should be understood in terms of ‘entanglement’. Entanglement allows us to explore the complexities of human-technology relations, acknowledging the inseparability of humans and implantable technologies. Our theoretical foundations regarding the role of embodiment may be tested empirically once more people will be living with regenerative implants. (shrink)

This text gives examples of how a different kind of human experience may be explored, and how the methods used for investigating phenomena may contribute to the process of human understanding.

This book develops a view of logic as a theory of information-driven agency and intelligent interaction between many agents - with conversation, argumentation and games as guiding examples. It provides one uniform account of dynamic logics for acts of inference, observation, questions and communication, that can handle both update of knowledge and revision of beliefs. It then extends the dynamic style of analysis to include changing preferences and goals, temporal processes, group action and strategic interaction in games. Throughout, the book (...) develops a mathematical theory unifying all these systems, and positioning them at the interface of logic, philosophy, computer science and game theory. A series of further chapters explores repercussions of the 'dynamic stance' for these areas, as well as cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper explains a fallacy that often arises in theorizing about human minds. I call it the Factual Belief Fallacy. The Fallacy, roughly, involves drawing conclusions about human psychology that improperly ignore the large backgrounds of mostly accurate factual beliefs people have. The Factual Belief Fallacy has led to significant mistakes in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science of religion. Avoiding it helps us better see the difference between factual belief and religious credence; seeing that difference in turn enables (...) us to pose interesting normative questions about various mental states labeled “belief.”. (shrink)

In het kader van de Leerstoel Rector Dhanis (UFSIA, Antwerpen) werd door een studiegroep bestaande uit artsen en verpleegkundigen, ethici en juristen, een interdisciplinaire studie ondernomen over 'klinische ethiek' en 'hoe recht en politiek omgaan met problemen die thuishoren in de klinische praktijk'. In deze bundel wordt het ethische denken in een aantal casussen betreffende neonatalen en dementerenden kritisch besproken. De adviezen van het Raadgevend Comite voor Bio-Ethiek over sterilisatie van mentaal gehandicapten en over klonering worden onderzocht op hun relevantie (...) voor de klinische praktijk. (shrink)

In a book that will appeal to a general audience as well as philosophers of religion, a leading metaphysician tackles fundamental theological problems in a lucid and engaging manner. Peter van Inwagen begins with a provocative new introduction exploring the question of whether a philosopher such as himself is qualified to address theological matters. The chapters that follow take up the central problem of evil in a world created and sustained by God.

The representation of reality is a fundamental concept in the perception of theworld. Its historical consideration leads to an understanding of historical andcontemporary culture. In this paper we specifically investigate theanthropometric stage of cultural development as a historical world view. Wedefine this stage on the basis of René Girard's hypotheses on the origin ofculture, and we isolate its principles. Next, we consider the function of art asthe representation of cultural values. We investigate the three major motivesof artistic representation in the (...) anthropometric stage, i.e. beauty, dramatizationand mimesis. We show how and why these motives play an essential partin the obfuscation and explanation of the origin of culture. Finally, we showhow these developments are dealt with in the aesthetics of Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

Australia II became the first foreign yacht to win the America's Cup in 1983. The boat had a revolutionary wing keel and a better underwater hull form. In official documents, Ben Lexcen is credited with the design. He is also listed as the sole inventor of the wing keel in a patent application submitted on February 5, 1982. However, as reported in _New York Times_, _Sydney Morning Herald_, and _Professional Boatbuilder_, the wing keel was in fact designed by engineer Peter (...) van Oossanen at the Netherlands Ship Model Basin in Wageningen, assisted by Dr. Joop Slooff at the National Aerospace Laboratory in Amsterdam. Based on telexes, letters, drawings, and other documents preserved in his personal archive, this paper presents van Oossanen’s account of how the revolutionary wing keel was designed. This is followed by an ethical analysis by Martin Peterson, in which he applies the American NSPE and Dutch KIVI codes of ethics to the information provided by van Oossanen. The NSPE and KIVI codes give conflicting advice about the case, and it is not obvious which document is most relevant. This impasse is resolved by applying a method of applied ethics in which similarity-based reasoning is extended to cases that are not fully similar. The key idea, presented in Peterson’s book _The Ethics of Technology_ (Peterson, The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of five moral principles, Oxford University Press, 2017), is to use moral paradigm cases as reference points for constructing a “moral map”. (shrink)

A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. I propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a "know"-parenthetical. A speaker (...) is thereby represented as knowing the proposition expressed because that is the semantic contribution of the parenthetical. I call this view parentheticalism and defend that it better explains knowledge representation than alternatives. As a consequence of outperforming assertoric explanations, parentheticalism opens the door to eliminating the act-type of assertion from linguistic theorizing. (shrink)

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists, in terms of symmetry and invariance. In this book van Fraassen argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. He analyzes and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe there are, and argues that we should disregard the idea of law as an adequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the author develops the empiricist (...) view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. (shrink)

Even in the Netherlands, where the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD) has been legalized for over 20 years, there is no such thing as a ‘right to die’. Especially patients with extraordinary requests, such as a wish for PAD based on psychiatric suffering, advanced dementia, or (a limited number of) multiple geriatric syndromes, encounter barriers in access to PAD. In this paper, we discuss whether these barriers can be justified in the context of the Dutch situation where PAD is legally (...) permitted for those who suffer unbearably and hopelessly as a result of medical conditions. Furthermore, we explore whether there are options to address some of the barriers or their consequences, both within the Dutch legal framework or by adjusting the legal framework, and whether these options are feasible. We conclude that although there are insufficient arguments to overrule the doctor’s freedom of conscience in the Netherlands, there are ways to address some of the barriers, mainly by offering support to doctors that would be willing to support a request. Moreover, we believe it is morally required to reduce or mitigate where possible the negative consequences of the barriers for patients, such as the long waiting time for those who suffer from psychiatric disorders, because it is unlikely the adjustments suggested to the system will ensure reasonable access for these patient groups. (shrink)

The concept of mind is widely used in today’s debates on the lives, behavior, and cognition of prehistoric hominins. It is therefore presumably an important concept. Yet it is very rarely defined, and in most cognitive-archaeological literature, it does not seem to point to anything distinctive. In recent years, talk of minds has also been criticized as being internalistic and dualistic, in supposed contrast to new materialistic and externalistic approaches. In this paper, I aim to defend a different concept of (...) mind which can be used in theorizing about prehistoric hominin cognition. In short, my concept is simply that of the first-person viewpoint, understood in a naturalized manner, and as characterized by intentionality. The discussion proceeds by examining what I perceive to be three prevailing misconceptions about minds, which I derive mainly from the archaeological literature. I use this discussion to outline my own concept of mind, as well as to defend it against the frequently heard criticisms of dualism and internalism. In the final parts, I briefly discuss some potential practical applications of an intentional approach to past minds. Here I focus on certain conceptual problems in debates on symbolic cognition. (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does (...) not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation - as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance - presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. (shrink)

El artículo responde al intento de sistematización del pensamiento agustiniano sobre la predestinación, hecho por G. Kraus, señalando sus aciertos y sus errores. Por otra parte, demuestra que el tema de la predestinación no ocupa un lugar relevante en la obra antipelagiana, subrayando la importancia y los matices que añade el hecho de que los destinatarios de las obras sobre la predestinación sean monjes.

El artículo trata de la manera en que Agustín presenta a sus "auctoritates" en la discusión con Juliano de Eclana y cómo las usa en su polémica. Sin detenerse en los contenidos de los textos citados ni en los asuntos teológicos en cuestión en el debate entre Juliano y Agustín, presenta las quejas y críticas de Juliano. Después se ofrece un esbozo de cómo Agustín presenta a cada uno de sus doctores. Finalmente, examina cómo son usados estos Padres en la (...) defensa que hace Agustín. (shrink)

I identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist’s selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen’s original and K. Brad Wray’s newer interpretation. In Wray’s version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community – viz. scientists’ interests, goals, and preferences – explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray’s version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change over time. (...) Theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science are however not faddish. They are mostly stable; that is, long-lived and consistent over time. This is because scientists (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to what I will call the testability norm: scientific theories must make falsifiable claims about the external physical world. The testability norm and not psycho-sociology explains the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science. Contra Wray, scientific anti-realists can then maintain that the external physical world (as expressed in the testability norm) explains theory-success. (shrink)